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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATFOFUTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
PATRICK HENR\ v \! DBZ, • 
Defendant/Appellant, 
rd». \To. 20070614-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION \NW M \ II IRF I W IM« )( 'HHDINdS 
This is an appeal from consecutive sentences on five third degree felonies: "'-. *'- * 
receiving stolen property, attempted burglary, forgery, and two counts of attempted theft by 
receiving. This Court , < Kv^JOUbi, 
STATEMfcN i » >H THE ISSUE AND S1ANDARD Ox ^ ^ 'IT W 
w ;;iv iiiai ^ -a; i «bu>v; its discretion %i imposing five consecutive zero-to-five year 
terms when *" - , ..jj 'j,\j «,; u:w icquired statutory 
factors? 
No standai aoiic\ iew applies. Defendant made no timely objection to the trial court's 
imposition * • ;. 
CONSTIIUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATI IKS., ANI) \<\ II .RS 
A ny relevant constitutional provision, statute, or rule is cited in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged in five different informations with two second 
degree felonies, four third degree felonies, and seven misdemeanors. 
District court case no. 061907518. The first information was filed in June 2006 and 
included one felony and four misdemeanors: forgery, a third degree felony; purchase, 
transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a class A 
misdemeanor; attempted theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor; theft by receiving stolen 
property, a class B misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. R518:l-3l 
District court case no. 061904724. The second information was filed in July 2006 
and included one felony and one misdemeanor: theft by receiving stolen property, a third 
degree felony; and theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. R724:2-3. 
District court case no. 061905899. The third information was filed in September 
2006 and included one felony and two misdemeanors: burglary, a second degree felony; 
theft, a class A misdemeanor; and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor. R899:2-3. 
District court case no. 061906778. The fourth information was filed in October 
2006 and included one felony: theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony. 
R778:l-2. 
*To differentiate the five pleadings volumes, the State will include the last three 
numbers of the district court case number in its citation, e.g., R[last three numbers of dist. 
court, case no.]:[internal record numbers]. Thus, citation to district court case no. 
061907516 is indicated by the designation R516: [internal page numbers], and so on. 
2 
.;^o/iet court case nr> ^71901234. The fi fth infdimatioii was filed in November 20uo 
• ' • .. - , , u ! ) i , c t i s nig stoicn property, a second degree felony; and 
failure to respond to an officer's sip.nnl In \ n;wH •- .cic: *_.- •. . 2. 
: .Plea agreement ! :>e three second degree felonies char H I • - 3 
attempts ana aeieriucUii UJU caller pled guillv fo flu third degree felonies: forgery, in 
violation of t IT \ '(" . . ., . - , . ,„, . * KOLAI rig stolen property, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 7o-o-40b (Wo:? "<*- : 1 e...t .„ I 
burglary,, in * 10'lation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7(>-4~102(3), 76-6-202 <West 2004); and two 
c o u i r -. f :n t: -i- _ * , v;. . .u .-; olen property, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN; § § 
76-4-102(3), 76-6-408 (Wc^i 2004 & bur- "* ^ P'l .SI I >, ' -IS, R724.J. -1,32, 
39; R899:2-4, 33,42; R778:1 -2. 34, 41: K234 1 -3. M W; see a£w R43:3-4 (thepresentence 
R-po' . ,. : .. ... :i\ ^u»pv,j. l'hc remaining seven misdemeanor charges were 
dismissed. Id. 
Sentence. At the consolidated sentencing hearing, (lie trial )ii 1 unpliasi/od 
defen-.i.-. -i\ .xtensive criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal 
episodes/' R55:5. Thr jl \ < > 'i IIHTI unposo.1 consecuuve indeterminate prison terms of 
zero-to-five years for each of the five third degree felony conv u • 1 < - < ' - J< - s- ;' 
: *- •, • ^ x v l l 42;R234:90-91.2 
2
 A copy of the consolidated sentencing hearing trimsc1 i|«i "s aiuclicd JII uic 
addendum. 
3 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed timely notices of appeal. See R518:48; 
R724:46; R899:44; R778:43; R234:92. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
District court case no. 061907518. Defendant and a female cohort attempted to cash 
a stolen check at the Check City located at 2490 West 4700 South, in Taylorsville City. 
R518:3; R43:5. The check was in the amount of $800 and was written on an account 
belonging to Joe Roage. R518:3. Roage reported being burglarized that same morning. Id. 
In addition to the stolen checks, the burglar took two Samsonite bags, a television, and CDs 
and DVDs. Id. Defendant and his female cohort were later apprehended and found in 
possession of Roage's property. R43:5. Defendant's cohort said that he had Roage's 
property when she picked him up, and she admitted attempting to cash one of Roage's 
checks. R518:4. A search of defendant's person yielded a knife and two syringes. Id. 
Defendant admitted carrying a concealed knife and to using narcotics. Id. 
District court case no. 061904724. A burglar forced open the front door of Mario 
Ramos's home and took several items, including a Jupiter Alto Saxophone valued at 
approximately $ 1200. R724:4. Defendant was caught on videotape pawning the saxophone 
for $40 at a Cash America located at 4235 West 3500 South. Id. The Cash America 
Because defendant pled guilty, the relevant facts are drawn from the Informations, 
defendant's statements in support of his guilty pleas, the transcript of the consolidated 
sentencing hearing, and the presentence report. 
4 
employee vended defendant's identity at "the time of the 'transaction and recorded his 
fingerprint, . -
District court < ;- ' ' 7,-,j- ' .. . > JCW ^ihcers responded to a 
burglary in progress at 3390 South 685 East R43:6. The officers J^IW defendant vdu\ ing 
a .,. . vision from the home, Id. When defendant realized he had been seen, he dropped the 
television and fled <* - .uincinciuikcis. , . i< -* 4. The door of the 
home had been kicked in ^±d the interior ransack, J c : ; 
nephew, was apprehended at the scene, Id. at 7. Defendant and his nephew had been in the 
rrocrss iifloiiiJinj' film; slnlen pioperty inki a stolen \ chicle when the police officers arrived. 
Id.; see also RZ99:3-4 
District court case no. 061906778. Rachel McCalFs car was stolen from where it was 
/ ; . . i:> residence. R4^:7. A West Valley City police officer 
saw defendant park in an alley and bep, in Minim iri^  iIiiiijL?,s from ihe u,n he bad been driving 
and throwing them in a nearby dumpster. Id. A records check revealed that the car belt in j:»cd 
.. .uu u ai^ car and noted that the engine was running, but that 
there was no key in the igninnn If ""7.! ' l« V < in n ni ueicndaiu s person revealed "a 
movie ticket with McCalFs name on it and a filed down ear key." Id. at 3. 
,,;; out: L ..A :;< >•/ i ..* * Defendant initially eluded police driving a stolen 
vehicle in a hieh-sne * ! ; "'* • R4 V'i I lie smlui \ e;, . .w was found shortly 
thereafter, parkednearthe service entrance of a Sam's Club stun"1: It n:ntv,d af 7571 South 3800 
Wi. .,i in ; ail L ,^c County. R234:2. Defendant was spotted in a rear comer of the store 
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"wearing a coat liner" inside out. Id. Realizing he had been seen, defendant headed to the 
front of the store. Id. Defendant was stopped and asked for his Sam's Club card, which he 
did not have. Id. Defendant first claimed to have entered the store with his mother, but then 
said that he had just come through the front doors. Id. at 3. A store employee said defendant 
had "approached the front of the store several times to look outside," and acted "extremely 
nervous." Id. Defendant appeared to have just shaven and still had red marks on his face, 
"missed patches of hair, and hair clippings on his clothes." Id. A pair of black gloves and 
a black razor were found in a garbage can in the store restroom. Id. One of the sinks was 
also "covered with freshly shaven hair." Id. A sweatshirt was found hidden by some pallets 
in the rear of the store where the defendant was first seen. Id. 
Defendant denied having a car and said he was planning to ride the bus. Id. But 
defendant had a key to the stolen vehicle in his pocket. Id. Defendant did not have the 
vehicle owner's permission to drive or use her car. Id. 
Consolidated sentencing hearing. At the consolidated sentencing hearing, the trial 
court confirmed that defense counsel had "seen the pre-sentence report" before proceeding. 
R55:2. Defense counsel thereafter referenced information in the report, emphasizing that he 
did not want to "minimize" defendant's "horrible" criminal record, and acknowledging that 
defendant had "been essentially in and out of prison, and mostly in prison for the 
last—coming up on 40 years." Id. Defense counsel instead wanted to focus on defendant's 
attitude, which he characterized as being amenable to treatment: "He's never asked to be out 
6 
of jail. He told me from the very first time I met him, 'I am a drug addict. I need to be in 
jail. I want help. Please get me help.'" Id. at 3; see also id. at 5. Defense counsel 
emphasized that defendant had "taken a level of responsibility," and had "never complained." 
Id. at 3. According to counsel, in defendant's long criminal history, this was the first time 
that defendant had admitted to being an addict and that "this [was] something that he [could] 
not handle on his own." Id. at 4. Defense counsel argued that defendant had reached the age 
in life where he realized "that he doesn't have a whole lot of time left, and . . . he doesn't 
really want to spend" that time "in prison." Id. Defendant was also interested in re-engaging 
in his son's life. Id. Defense counsel asked the trial court to grant probation and put 
defendant in a treatment program, but he also recognized that there was a "strong 
presumption that [defendant] will go to prison on these cases; and that [defendant had] come 
to terms with that throughout this whole case." Id. at 5. If the trial court imposed prison 
terms, defense counsel asked that it follow the recommendation for concurrent terms in the 
presentence report. Id. Given the opportunity to address the court himself, defendant 
emphasized that he wanted to "get some treatment." Id. 
The prosecutor agreed with the recommendation for concurrent prison terms. Id. at 
5-6. The prosecutor emphasized that the parole board could ultimately decide "how well 
[defendant was] doing in terms of his drug habit and that sort of thing in prison." Id. at 6. 
The trial court also heard from one of defendant's victims. Id. at 7. The victim 
explained that he felt violated by defendant's criminal conduct, that he worked two jobs to 
earn a living, and that, in his opinion, defendant should not be granted probation. Id. 
7 
Just before the trial court pronounced sentence, defense counsel asked the court to 
grant defendant credit for time served, assuming that the trial court was inclined to follow 
the recommendation for concurrent prison terms. Id. at 8. The trial court, however, rejected 
the recommendation for concurrent terms and imposed consecutive terms, but did grant credit 
for time served. Id. at 8-9. In so doing, the trial court expressly noted defendant's "extensive 
criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal episodes." Id. Defendant 
raised no objection. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Although defendant asked for probation in this case, he acknowledged the strong 
possibility of receiving prison terms instead. If the trial court was inclined to deny probation, 
defendant asked the court to follow the recommendation for concurrent prison terms, but 
made no argument against consecutive prison terms. Moreover, he did not object to the 
imposition of consecutive prison terms, and never asserted that the trial court had failed to 
consider his character and rehabilitative needs, as he now asserts on appeal. Nor does 
defendant assert that this Court should review his claim of sentencing error under the 
doctrines of plain error or exceptional circumstances. Thus, defendant's unpreserved 
challenge to his consecutive sentences may not be reviewed on appeal. 
But even assuming that defendant preserved his challenge to the trial court's 
imposition of consecutive terms, he fails to show any abuse of the trial court's broad 
sentencing discretion. Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, the record reflects that 
8 
the trial court considered his character and rehabilitative needs before imposing the 
consecutive terms. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS 
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive zero-to-five-year 
terms, alleging that the trial court did not adequately consider his "character and 
rehabilitative needs." Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant further asserts that the imposition of 
consecutive terms "removed from the Board of Pardons and Parole the opportunity to 
monitor [defendant's] rehabilitation and decide his rehabilitative needs if he continued to 
show improvement through an appropriate treatment program." Id. at 15. Defendant's 
claims should be rejected for at least two reasons. 
First, defendant raised no objection below. His challenge is thus unpreserved and he 
does not assert plain error or exceptional circumstances. Second, even assuming that 
defendant had objected to the consecutive sentences below, he fails to show any abuse of the 
trial court's broad sentencing discretion. The record reflects that the trial court considered 
his character and rehabilitative needs. Moreover, the consecutive third degree terms had a 
floor of zero years. Accordingly, the consecutive terms do not deprive the Board of its 
discretion to consider defendant's future progress toward rehabilitation. 
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A. Defendant preserved no challenge to the trial court's 
imposition of consecutive terms, and raises no claim of plain 
error or exceptional circumstances* 
Utah courts will not consider claims raised "for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 
4, % 23,128 P.3d 1171 (case citation and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, % 33,122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,551 (Utah 1987). Utah's courts require timely and specific objections 
"in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate."5 State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citation omitted). See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 ("c [T]he trial court ought 
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it5") 
(quoting State v. Eldredge, 11Z P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)). 
"Accordingly, an objection cmust at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial [court] can consider it.555 Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361). 
Here, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to five third degree 
felonies—three of which were reduced from second degree felonies—in exchange for 
dismissing the seven remaining misdemeanors. See, e.g., R43:3-4. The plea agreement did 
not address what recommendation, if any, the prosecutor might give. Id. The presentence 
report recommended concurrent prison terms. Id. at 2. At the sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel asked for probation, but recognized the likelihood of prison terms and alternatively 
asked the trial court to follow the recommendation in the presentence report. R55:5. He 
10 
made no argument against consecutive terms. Id.; see also id. at 2-4, 6-8. When the trial 
court rejected the recommendation for concurrent terms and instead imposed consecutive 
terms, emphasizing defendant's "extensive criminal record," and "the fact that these [were] 
all separate criminal episodes," defendant raised no objection, and never suggested that the 
trial court had failed to consider all legally relevant factors. R55:8. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that his challenge to the consecutive 
terms was preserved when defense counsel asked the trial court to follow the 
recommendation in the presentence report for concurrent terms. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (citing 
R55:5,43). But defense counsel's request was wholly insufficient to alert the trial court to 
the error now claimed on appeal—that it failed to consider defendant's "character and 
rehabilitative needs" before it imposed consecutive terms. Aplt. Br. at \\\see also id. at 16. 
In other words, defense counsel's request that the trial court follow the sentencing 
recommendation did not raise the now alleged sentencing error "'to a level of consciousness 
such that the trial [court] [could] consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33 (quoting Brown, 856 
P.2d at 361); State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 17, 122 P.3d 566 (holding Weaver failed to 
"distinctly or specifically" articulate claimed error with regard to trial court's ruling on the 
inadmissibility of a police report and thus waived the claim on appeal). 
This Court's opinion in State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420,147 P.3d 497, supports 
that the consecutive sentencing issue in this case is unpreserved. Although Williams's 
challenge to his consecutive terms was sufficiently raised in the trial court, this Court deemed 
the preservation issue in Williams to be a close question. Id. at \ 28 n. 6 ("We deem the issue 
11 
sufficiently preserved, albeit marginally so"). It was a close question because Williams's 
defense counsel did not specifically object to the consecutive terms in that case, but did 
"assert[] that he had questions about the consecutive nature of Williams's sentences." Id. 
Moreover, Williams himself complained that the sentence "was ckind of harsh.'" Id. 
Although these broad statements were deemed sufficient to preserve the consecutive 
sentencing issue in Williams, no similar statements or objections to the imposition of 
consecutive terms are found in this record. See Rl 16:1-5. Thus, unlike Williams, defendant 
did not preserve any challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms. 
In sum, because defendant did not object to the legality of the trial court's consecutive 
sentences below, see R55:8, and because he does not assert plain error or exceptional 
circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 6-15, appellate review of the claimed sentencing 
error is foreclosed. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 23 n.6 (declining to infer a plain error argument); 
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review unpreserved 
issue because Pledger did not argue that review was justified by "'exceptional circumstances' 
or 'plain error'" (case citation omitted)). 
B. Defendant fails to show any abuse of the trial court's broad 
sentencing discretion. 
Even assuming that the Court deems the consecutive sentencing issue preserved here, 
defendant has shown no abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
12 
L Utah trial courts have broad sentencing 
discretion. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004), requires that when choosing between 
consecutive and concurrent sentences, "the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant." A trial court may thus commit error or abuse of its discretion, if it imposes 
consecutive terms without considering all the factors that are legally relevant to the 
sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). A trial court, however, need not 
explicitly note "the extent to which it considered each of the factors" relating to the specific 
factors listed above. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1fl[ 10-11,40 P.3d 626. 
In addition, "as a general rule [the reviewing court] upholds . . . the findings on the 
record whenever it would be reasonable to assume the [trial] court actually made such 
findings." Id. at |^ 11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). See State v. Valdovinos, 
2003 UT App 432,128, 82 P.3d 1167 ("the burden is on the defendant to show that the trial 
court did not properly consider all the factors in section 76-3-401(4)"). The presumptive 
protection afforded to a trial court's sentence can be rebutted only if "(1) an ambiguity of 
facts make the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute explicitly provides that written findings 
must be made, or (3), a prior case states that findings on an issue must be made." Helms, 
2002 UT 12, \ 11 (internal citations omitted). None of these circumstances exists here. 
13 
Moreover, the trial court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors reflects the 
general principle that courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters. It is the 
trial court, after all, that is in the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic 
assessments required in sentencing decisions. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 
1997). In deciding the appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court must consider 
many intangibles, like the defendant's "character, personality, and attitude, of which the cold 
record gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). 
2. The record supports that the trial court considered defendant *s 
character and rehabilitative needs in imposing consecutive 
terms; therefore, no abuse of discretion exists. 
Here, contrary to defendant's claim, "the record . . . actually contains evidence to 
suggest that the trial court did consider all of the factors," including defendant's character 
and rehabilitative needs. Helms, 2002 UT12, f 13. Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate 
any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court failed to consider "all of the statutory 
factors mandated under Utah law" when it imposed the consecutive sentences below. Aplt. 
Br. at 6, 16. See also Section 76-3-401(2). Defendant identifies and analyzes only two of 
the required factors in his brief—character and rehabilitative needs. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 11 
("[T]he trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences without 
adequately considering [defendant's] character and rehabilitative needs"), 15 ("[T]he trial 
court in this case failed to consider [defendant's] character or rehabilitative needs"). The 
State's analysis thus focuses on these two factors. 
14 
Notably, defendant acknowledges that "[t]he presentence report... considered all of 
the statutory factors," and he does not claim that the trial court failed to review the 
presentence report before the consolidated sentencing hearing. Aplt. Br. at 6. Nor could he, 
because the record supports that the trial court reviewed the presentence report. Indeed, the 
trial court made sure that defense counsel had reviewed the report before the court would 
even proceed with the sentencing hearing. See R55:2. Defense counsel affirmed that he had 
reviewed the report, and then relied on information in the report in his argument to the trial 
court. See, e.g., id.; see also id. at 5. But rather than focus on defendant's "horrible" 
criminal history as detailed in the report, defense counsel argued that the trial court should 
consider an alleged recent change in defendant's attitude and amenability to treatment: 
"[T]hat's what we want the [c]ourt to know, and that's what we want the [c]ourt to focus on, 
at least a little bit, rather than just focus on his past." Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 3. 
Although defense counsel argued that defendant's allegedly changed attitude rendered 
him amenable to treatment, the information in the presentence report undercut that assertion. 
For example, defendant told the presentence investigator that, although he had been accepted 
into both the Odyssey House and Salvation Army programs, "he would rather complete the 
Salvation Army program because he ha[d] heard how tough the Odyssey House program can 
be stating, CI don't want to set myself up to fail.'" R43:3. A handwritten note in the margin, 
presumably made by the trial court, consequently questioned defendant's amenability to 
treatment: "Odyssey House too tough?" Id. 
15 
Defendant's statement in the presentence report indicated his "remorse for each and 
every time I find myself in jail or on my way back to prison." R43:7. That remorse, 
however, is more directed at his suffering the consequences of his conduct than it is to his 
innumerable victims: "I can see that there are many victim's to my crime's [sic] and to the 
life styel [sic] of my pass [sic]. I see one more when I look at myself!" R43:8. 
Given the above, and defendant's extensive criminal history, dating back to 1966, see 
R43:10-15, the presentence investigator reasonably questioned the credibility of defendant's 
assertion that he had a changed attitude: "[Although the defendant states he wants the 
opportunity for treatment (and has been 'accepted'), what makes 'this time' so different?" 
R43:3. Thus, although the investigator "[initially" "had empathy for the defendant and 
thought he should be given one chance at probation with treatment," the investigator 
ultimately concluded defendant needed to be in prison: "[I]t would be one thing if his crimes 
had no victims, but every one of his current offenses has a victim (s). The defendant 
repeatedly committed offenses against society and specifically, random innocent individuals 
to support his drug habit." Id. 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the trial court emphasized defendant's 
"extensive criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate criminal episodes" when 
deciding to impose consecutive rather than concurrent terms. R55:8. The trial court's 
emphasis on these factors, however, does not suggest that it failed to consider defendant's 
character and rehabilitative needs, as defendant now claims. See Aplt. Br. at 11,16. Indeed, 
as noted, it is undisputed that defendant's character and rehabilitative needs were folly set 
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out in the presentence report—and that the trial court reviewed the report. See, e.g., Aplt Br. 
at 6. Moreover, defendant's asserted change of attitude and amenability to treatment were 
the entire focus of defense counsel's oral argument at the consolidated sentencing hearing. 
See R55. The record thus supports that the trial court considered defendant's character and 
rehabilitative needs, it merely gave them little weight. See section 76-3-401(2). 
The real crux of defendant's complaint on appeal appears to be that the trial court 
disagreed with his assessment of his character and prospects for rehabilitation. "However, 
the fact that [defendant] views his situation differently than did the trial court does not prove 
that the trial court neglected to consider" either criteria. Helm, 2002 UT 12, f 14. Defendant 
also wants more explanation for the trial court's deviation from the recommendation for 
concurrent terms. Aplt. Br. at 13. But the trial court's comments at the sentencing hearing, 
emphasizing defendant's "extensive criminal history," and "separate criminal episodes," are 
a sufficient basis for departing from that recommendation. Indeed, a trial court need not 
explicitly note "the extent to which it considered each of the factors" in section 76-3-401(2). 
Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 10. Moreover, nothing in section 76-3-401(2) requires trial courts to 
accord each of the statutory factors equal weight, let alone give more weight to a defendant's 
newly alleged change of heart over his dismal criminal history and number of victims. See 
State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,1137 (Utah 1989) (no abuse of discretion where trial court 
gave more weight to circumstances of offense than to Gibbon's desire to change and post-
arrest good behavior). See also State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-119 (Utah 1985) 
(recognizing that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to circumstances of 
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crime); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in mitigation or 
aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale"); State v. Kelly, 784 
P.2d 144,145 (Utah 1989) (not abuse of discretion to give little weight to defendant's lack 
of similar criminal history, cooperation with law enforcement, or candidacy for a recognized 
treatment program). 
3. State v. Smith and State v. Galli are not 
controlling. 
Because this case involves the imposition of consecutive third degree felony terms, 
rather than consecutive first degree felony terms, it is distinguishable from both State v. 
Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), and State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). Defendant 
cites these cases to support his assertion that the trial court failed to adequately consider his 
rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 15. Smith and Galli stand for the proposition that a 
trial court abuses its sentencing discretion when consecutive sentences deprive the Board of 
Pardons and Parole of its discretion to consider a defendant's progress toward rehabilitation. 
See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245, and Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. Thus, although the Smith and Galli 
trial courts considered the requisite criteria, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately overturned 
the consecutive sentences in both cases. 
For example, in Smith, the supreme court held that consecutive, fifteen-year 
minimum-mandatory sentences on four first degree felony offenses—sixty years—amounted 
to a defacto life term that effectively deprived the Board of "discretion" to take into account 
Smith's "future conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation." 909 P.2d at 244-45. 
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Although the imposition of consecutive sentences on three indeterminate first degree felony 
terms in Galli did not involve minimum-mandatory terms, and did not result in an effective 
life term, a majority of the supreme court held that the consecutive sentences were sufficient 
to deprive the Board of its discretion. Galli, 967 P.2d 938. This is because running the first 
degree felony terms consecutively in Galli meant that Galli was ostensibly facing a minimum 
of fifteen years to life. Id. 
In this case, on the other hand, the five third degree felony terms had a floor of zero 
to five years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Thus, even running them 
consecutively the floor remains at zero years. Given this circumstance, defendant's 
consecutive sentences for five indeterminate third degree felonies are not comparable to the 
consecutive first degree felony terms imposed in Smith and Galli. They certainly in no way 
impinge on the Board's discretion. Indeed, the Board will exercise its discretion to decide 
just how many years, "not to exceed five years," that defendant actually serves on each of 
the five terms. § 76-3-203(3). In other words, if defendant shows improvement he may be 
released from prison at any time—there is no minimum number of years he must serve. If, 
on the other hand, defendant does not progress toward rehabilitation, the Board retains 
discretion to keep him incarcerated for up to twenty-five years. 
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court considered defendant's character and 
rehabilitative needs. And the consecutive sentences do not infringe the Board's discretion 
to determine the actual length of defendant's incarceration. Defendant therefore fails to show 
any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's imposition of five consecutive zero-to-five year terms should be 
affirmed. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 22, 2007) 
3 THE COURT: Okay. All right, this is the time and date 
4 I set for sentencing in the matters of Patrick Valdez and Donald 
5 Valdez. I understand the same individual; is that right? 
6 MR. CORUM: Yes, Judge. 
7 THE COURT: You've seen the pre-sentence report? 
8 MR. CORUM: We have. 
9 THE COURT: All right. Please be proceed. 
10 I MR. CORUM: Judge, my understanding the Court has 
11 received a letter from Mr. Valdez that was forwarded, to my 
12 office and to the State on his (inaudible). Have you reviewed 
13 I that, by any chance? 
14 THE COURT: It's not in the file. Do you have it? 
15 MR. CORUM: I do. May I approach? I think this — a 
16 lot of these things are things he said to — in his discussions 
17 with AP&P and in his statement to AP&P. 
18 I am not going to stand up here and in any way 
19 minimize or attempt to minimize what he's done or his record. 
20 I mean, quite — it's horrible. I mean, you know, Ms. Burton 
21 and I were just talking about it. I mean, his first stint in 
22 prison, you know, almost predates us as people. He's been 
23 essentially in and out of prison, and mostly in prison for the 
24 last — coming up on 40 years. You know, he gets out, he stays 
25 out for a little while, he re-offends, and then he's — 
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1 THE COURT: I remember the letter. I don't know why 
2 I don't have a copy. It's probably one in the files, I'm 
3 imagining. It's not — there it is. That's right. 
4 MR. CORUM: He was sent to prison on his — while he 
5 was 18 on his first adult offense; and he's going back ever 
6 since. Quite frankly, I think if people would have looked at 
7 it a little bit more closely, could have absolutely predicted 
8 this history and this pattern; and it's come to fruition. 
9 What I do want to focus on, Judge, is that Mr. Valdez, 
10 his attitude throughout this case, since I first met him, he 
11 has never — not even mentioned the possibility of getting out 
12 of jail. He's never asked to be out of jail. He told me from 
13 the very first time I met him, "I am a drug addict. I need to 
14 be in jail. I want help. Please get me help." 
15 He never talked about trying to beat the cases. We 
16 would talk about — you know, some of the — quite frankly, a 
17 couple of these, you know, I had some issues. I would talk to 
18 him about them, and he didn't want to hear any of it. He just 
19 wanted to — the only thing that prevented him from pleading 
20 his charges on these cases was that it took some time to get 
21 them all together. 
22 He has taken a level of responsibility that quite 
23 frankly I have not seen before, and a level of self awareness 
24 about what his problem is and what needs to happen that I 
25 think is very, very rare. He's never complained. He's never 
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1 (inaudible) delays of this. 
2 He's just taken it all in stride and said to me 
3 consistently, "That's fine. I need to be in jail right now. 
4 I need to be clean. Please get me some help. I've never had 
5 help. I've never had a program. I get out, you know, into the 
6 world. I get — things get stressful, and I fall right back 
7 into drugs every single time." 
8 It has, and he's noticed it, and his family's noticed 
9 it. His long-time friend, Barbara, is here, the mother of his 
10 son. She was relaying to me that this is the first time really 
11 this last period that she's ever seen him admit, number one, 
12 that he's a drug addict; but number two, that this is something 
13 that he cannot handle on his own. 
14 I don't know what the impetus of it was; whether it 
15 was just he was — he's gotten to that age where, you know, 
16 I he's facing his own mortality, and realizing that he doesn't 
17 have a whole lot of time left, and in that time-he doesn't 
18 really want to spend in prison. 
19 I do know that he connected with his son not too 
20 long ago. His son got back from Iraq and visited him at the 
21 jail when this first kind of started happening; and they were 
22 reconnected, and his son wants him in his life very, very much, 
23 and he wants to be in his son's life. 
24 So that's what we want the Court to know, and that's 
25 what we want the Court to focus on, at least a little bit, 
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1 rather than just focus on his past. That he does have a 
2 chance. He does have the attitude, I think, to at least give 
3 treatment a try for once. 
4 THE COURT: Right. 
5 MR. CORUM: That's what we're asking for. We have 
6 gone to both Odyssey House and Salvation Army. Myself and the 
7 treatment people feel fairly strongly that Salvation Army is a 
8 better option for him, that he will fair better there; but 
9 quite frankly, he — we'll take whatever he can get. 
10 Mr. Valdez does understand the strong presumption that 
11 he will go to prison on these cases; and he's come to terms 
12 with that throughout this whole case. If that were to happen, 
13 he would ask the Court to follow the recommendation that these 
14 be concurrent. 
15 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
16 Mr. Valdez, this is your opportunity to speak to me 
17 about your potential sentencing. Is there anything that you 
18 would like to say at this time? 
19 MR. VALDEZ: I don't think I could add any more than 
20 what he's said; but I'd just like to confirm that this is how I 
21 feel about dealing with it. I'd like to get some treatment. 
22 THE COURT: All right. What's rhe State's position? 
23 MR. PLATT: Chad Piatt for the State, Judge. The State 
24 agrees with the recommendation. Specifically that there's a 
25 paragraph that I think is the most noteworthy by the pre-
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1 sentence preparer on page 3. That is, initially that the 
2 investigator states that he had empathy, because he's very 
3 honest and straightforward with the things that he's done 
4 in the past. 
5 Then concludes, "However he does need to go to prison, 
6 based upon the fact that these crimes now are affecting 
7 innocent people." The majority of these crimes involve theft 
8 I to support the drug habit; and there's no way that the State 
9 can recommend anything else, but to protect our community. 
10 The concurrent sentence because of his attitude at 
11 this point, that's appropriate. However, I think he's going 
12 to be seeing the parole board and let them decide how well 
13 he's doing in terms of his drug habit and that sort of thing 
14 in prison, I'd submit on that. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Is there anybody here that 
16 wants to speak to this matter? 
17 (No response) 
18 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Corum, is there any legal 
19 reason of which you are aware not to proceed to sentence? 
20 MR. CORUM: No, Judge. 
21 THE COURT: Sir, do you want to speak? 
22 VICTIM: Your Honor, I was the person that he's — he 
23 I is the person that broke into my house. 
24 THE COURT: Come on up here, and tell me who you are, 
25 sir. Come right on up and introduce yourself for me. 
-7-
1 VICTIM: I apologize coming in dressed inappropriately, 
2 your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: You look absolutely fine. 
4 VICTIM: I'm sorry about that. I was the person that 
5 broke in — this person broke in my house. I really feel like 
6 I've been violated. 
7 THE COURT: I understand. 
8 VICTIM: I'm sorry, violated. I work two jobs. 
9 I work so hard to have my things, and with this guy with no 
10 consideration of — absolutely of nothing. You know, he broke 
11 into my house. I had problems. My insurance, they pay for it, 
12 but that is something that I would rather prefer to have my own 
13 things in the beginning before he opened. 
14 This the first time it happened? I think it's not the 
15 first time it happened. I come here, and there's several times 
16 you do this. Why do you do that? This has caused me a lot of 
17 pain, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT; Yes. 
19 VICTIM: I really (inaudible) that his sentence that he 
20 shouldn't be put on parole. Put him in jail, and this is where 
21 he belongs — where he belongs to. 
22 THE COURT: All right. 
23 VICTIM: Thank you, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Is there anybody else who 
25 wants to speak in this matter? 
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1 (No response) 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Corum, is there any legal reason of 
3 which you are aware why I should not proceed to sentence? 
4 MR. CORUM: No, Judge. We would ask the Court, if 
5 the Court's going to follow the recommendation, to make a 
6 recommendation that he receive credit for time served. 
7 THE COURT: All right. With respect to case ending 
8 1234, and the charge of attempted theft by receipt of stolen 
9 property, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to 
10 five at the Utah State Prison. 
11 With respect to the matter ending 7518, the charge of 
12 forgery, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to 
13 five at the Utah State Prison. 
14 With respect to the matter ending 724, theft by 
15 receipt of stolen property, a third-degree felony, I'm 
16 sentencing you to zero to five at the Utah State Prison. 
17 With respect to the matter ending 899, attempted 
18 burglary, a third-degree felony, I'm sentencing you to zero 
19 to five at the State Prison. 
20 With respect to the matter ending 778, the charge of 
21 attempted theft by receipt of stolen property, a third-degree 
22 ] felony, I'm sentencing you to zero to five at the State Prison. 
23 These will run consecutively, given your extensive 
24 criminal history, and the fact that these are all separate 
25 criminal episodes. You are to serve zero to twenty-five years 
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at the Utah State Prison as a result. You have 30 days in 
which to appeal your sentence. 
COURT CLERK: And did you say credit for time served? 
THE COURT: Credit for time served. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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